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FRACTURING REGULATION APPLIED
HANNAH WISEMAN†
INTRODUCTION
Since the drilling of the first commercial oil well in Titusville,
1
Pennsylvania, in 1859, a long and profitable history of fossil fuel
development in America has unfolded. Throughout this history, there
have been bursts of attention to both the positive and negative effects
2
of domestic development. Few energy issues have sparked as much
recent attention, however, as a once little-known technique called
hydraulic fracturing—also called fracing, fraccing, fracking, or
3
hydrofracking. Hydraulic fracturing exists in many forms, but its
central purpose is to crack the formation surrounding an gas or oil
4
well to encourage more gas or oil to flow through the well. The

† Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Professor Wiseman
extends her thanks to the Energy Institute of the University of Texas for funding the research
that produced a white paper entitled, State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations,
from which this article builds. The author thanks Joel Daniel, Chad Davis, Nikki Pasrija,
Matthew Peña, Jeremy Schepers, and Molly Wurzer of the University of Texas School of Law
for their very dedicated research efforts, which identified much of the violation and
enforcement information described in the white paper and in this article.
1. See GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS
REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 13 (2009), available at
http://www.gwpc.org/e-library/documents/general/State%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20
Regulations%20Designed%20to%20Protect%20Water%20Resources.pdf; Ross H. Pifer,
Drake Meets Marcellus: A Review of Pennsylvania Case Law Upon the Sesquicentennial of the
United States Oil and Gas Industry, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 47, 48 (2010).
2. The blowout of BP’s Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico, for example, sparked a
variety of studies and proposals for regulatory improvement. See, e.g., DEEPWATER HORIZON
STUDY GRP., THE MACONDO BLOWOUT 3RD PROGRESS REPORT (2010), available at
http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/DHSG_ThirdProgressReportFinal.pdf; Hari M.
Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 1077, 1077 (2011).
3. See Christopher Kulander, The States’ Legal Framework: Texas/Louisiana Region
American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, at *1, *6 (Rocky Mountain Mineral L. Found.,
Paper 3A, 2011), available at Westlaw 2011 NO. 5 RMMLF-INST PAPER NO. 3A (noting that
hydraulic fracturing is “known colloquially as ‘fraccing,’ ‘fracking,’ or ‘fracing’”); Coastal Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2008) (“‘fracing,’ as the process is
known in the industry”); Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 233 n.22 (2010) (documenting different terms used to describe hydraulic
fracturing).
4. The technique also expands existing fractures in formations. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
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technologies used to coax open these cracks in the formation vary
5
widely; the common technique of hydraulic fracturing in coalbeds,
for example, is substantially different from fracturing in densely6
packed shale and tight sands formations. The type of fracturing that
has attracted the strongest recent interest from media organizations,
academics, agencies, and politicians is the process applied to shales
and tight sands, which is called “slickwater” (or slick water)
7
fracturing.
Energy companies developed slickwater fracturing in the 1990s
in the Barnett Shale of Texas and have since transferred the
8
technique to shales around the country. In most cases, developing a
shale well requires construction of a well pad, which is the site that
hosts the well and associated equipment; drilling and casing the well,

AGENCY (EPA), EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING
WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 3-4 (2004),
available at http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/upload/completestudy.zip.
5. See id. at 3-2, 3-11 (noting that 13,973 coalbed methane wells were producing in 2000
and describing the process of fracturing a well, which requires drilling a production well in the
coalbed, injecting a “median average injection volume” of 57,500 gallons of water per well,
along with chemicals and fine sand for proppant).
6. See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WATER USE IN THE BARNETT SHALE,
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/wateruse_barnettshale.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2012)
(“Slick water fracking of a vertical well completion can use over 1.2 million gallons (28,000
barrels) of water, while the fracturing of a horizontal well completion can use over 3.5 million
gallons (over 83,000 barrels) of water.”); N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED
DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS
AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM, at ES-8 (2011), available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf (“It is estimated that 2.4 million to 7.8
million gallons of water may be used for a multi-stage hydraulic fracturing procedure in a typical
4000-foot lateral wellbore.”). Fracturing is necessary to produce gas or oil from shales and tight
sands. See Kulander, supra note 3, at 4.
7. See EPA, supra note 4, at 4-8. For additional information on horizontal drilling, which
typically precedes this process, see Jeffrey C. King, Selected Re-Emerging and Emerging Trends
in Oil and Gas Law as a Result of Production from Shale Formations, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 1, 3 (2011) (“Hydraulic fracturing is generally coupled with horizontal drilling so that as
much of the rock as possible is exposed to the fracture stimulation.”); PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL.
PROT., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OVERVIEW 1 (2010) [hereinafter HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
OVERVIEW],
available
at
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/OilGas/BOGM/BOGMPortalFiles/
MarcellusShale/DEP%20Fracing%20overview.pdf (“Horizontal well drilling and completion is
another technology used in the Marcellus Formation to increase the productivity of a gas well
by maximizing the length of the wellbore through the target formation.”).
8. See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WATER USE, supra note 6 (“In 1997, the first slick water
frac (or light sand frac) was performed and found to be very successful in stimulating the
Barnett Shale.”). Slickwater fracturing is differentiated from water fracturing because it uses
both large volumes of water and a gel or other friction reducer. Jay A. Rushing & Richard B.
Sullivan,
Improved
Water-Frac
Increases
Production,
E&P,
Oct.
12,
2007,
http://www.epmag.com/archives/features/661.htm.
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9

often using horizontal drilling techniques; punching holes in small
segments of the well far beneath the surface; and pumping a solution
10
of water and chemicals down the well at high pressure. This process
forces the solution out through the perforations in the well, fracturing
11
the surrounding formation and expanding any existing fractures.
While conducting a slickwater fracturing operation, operators also
pump a proppant, such as sand, into the well to prop open the
fractures and allow oil or gas to flow up through the well’s production
casing—a tube inserted into the well for the purpose of isolating the
12
oil or gas and allowing it to flow up the well.
The specific technique of slickwater fracturing varies
substantially among formations and among wells within one
formation. Engineers at well sites drill different well depths, fracture
wells at different pressures, and apply a variety of chemical types and
quantities based on many factors, including the density and
13
composition of the formation being fractured. Despite differences

9. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., DRILLING FOR NATURAL GAS IN THE MARCELLUS
SHALE FORMATION 1 (2008), available at http://files.dep.state.pa.us/OilGas/BOGM/
BOGMPortalFiles/MarcellusShale/MarcellusFAQ.pdf (stating, partially incorrectly, that
fracturing the Marcellus Shale “requires” horizontal drilling); J. DANIEL ARTHUR & MARK
LAYNE, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATURAL GAS WELLS OF THE
MARCELLUS SHALE 7–8 (2008), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials
_minerals_pdf/GWPCMarcellus.pdf (describing both horizontal and vertical completions in the
Marcellus and explaining that horizontal wells are more productive); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE 90-DAY
REPORT 8 (2011) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 90-DAY REPORT], available at
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/081811_90_day_report_final.pdf
(noting
the
importance of horizontal drilling combined with fracturing to develop shales). Horizontal
drilling involves an operator drilling straight down into a formation and then deviating the drill
bit. See Joseph H. Frantz, Jr., Natural Gas, Range Resources, and the Marcellus Shale, at *1, *4
(Rocky Mountain Mineral L. Found., Paper 2, 2010), available at Westlaw 2010 NO. 5 RMMLFINST PAPER NO. 2. Multiple horizontal wells can be drilled from one pad, with the horizontal
portions of the wellbores radiating away from each other. Thomas Swartz, Hydraulic Fracturing:
Risks and Risk Management, 26 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 30, 30 (2011).
10. See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-91 to -97 (describing
hydraulic fracturing procedure); HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OVERVIEW, supra note 7
(describing the slickwater fracture process).
11. N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-95.
12. Id.; see GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 20 (explaining that the
production casing is inserted into the “target formation” (the formation from which oil or gas is
produced) or the top of the target formation).
13. See, e.g., N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-30 (noting that at
the drilling stage, factors such as “formation depth and thickness, mechanical and physical
factors associated with the well construction program, production experience in the area, [and]
lease position and topography” affect the drilling pattern); cf. id. at 5-88 (noting that “for any
given area and formation, hydraulic fracturing design is an iterative process”).
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among specific slickwater fracturing techniques, the process as a
whole has fundamentally changed American oil and gas production.
14
It has made fracturing the norm in gas development, encouraged
15
and enabled abundant
new horizontal drilling techniques,
16
production of shale oil in certain areas of the country. In reshaping
the domestic energy landscape, the technique has introduced several
new stages to the development process, requiring larger volumes of
17
18
water and new types of chemicals. Just as importantly, it has
allowed operators to drill thousands of new oil and gas wells, thus
19
expanding the impacts of traditional drilling to new sites.
14. Approximately ninety percent of all new gas wells are fractured. See Ben Casselman &
Russell Gold, Drilling Tactic Unleashes a Trove of Natural Gas—And a Backlash, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 21, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.uppermon.org/news/Other/WSJ-Backlash21Jan10.html.
15. Kulander, supra note 3, at 5 (“The prevalence of horizontal drilling has . . . increased
the importance of fracing as boreholes can now traverse through a much longer portion of a
targeted horizon instead of the interval covered by vertical or slant drilling, making the return to
the operator in increased production worth the cost of mobilization of a fleet of fracing
equipment.”); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 90-DAY REPORT supra note 9, at 8 (noting that “the
combination of two technologies working together—hydraulic fracturing and horizontal
drilling—made shale gas commercial” in 2002 and 2003).
16. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TECHNOLOGY-BASED OIL AND NATURAL GAS
PLAYS: SHALE SHOCK! COULD THERE BE BILLIONS IN THE BAKKEN? 1 (2006), available at
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/features/ngshock.pdf (describing “highly productive oil field discoveries
within the Bakken Formation” enabled by horizontal drilling and fracturing).
17. See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WATER USE, supra note 6 (estimating that a horizontal
well that is fractured requires more than 3.5 million gallons of water); MARCELLUS SHALE
ADVISORY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 17 (2011), available at http://files.dep.state.pa.us/
PublicParticipation/MarcellusShaleAdvisoryCommission/MarcellusShaleAdvisoryPortalFiles/M
SAC_Final_Report.pdf (noting that “much larger quantities of water are required for gas
shale”); N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-93 to -94 (estimating that
hydraulically fracturing a single shale well requires between 2.5 and 7.8 million gallons of
water).
18. See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-42 to -48 (listing
chemical additives in hydraulic fracturing fluids); U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM.
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE MINORITY STAFF, CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING 13–30 (2011), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Hydraulic%20Fracturing%20Report%204.18.11.pdf (listing hundreds
of chemical components that were used in various hydraulic fracturing treatments between 2005
and 2009). Fracturing prior to the 1990s often used much larger quantities of sand and gels in
lieu of large volumes of water. See Rushing & Sullivan, supra note 8.
19. See, e.g., PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., WELLS DRILLED, available at
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/2011%20Wells%20Drilled.gif
(last
visited Mar. 23, 2012) (showing 1751 wells drilled in the Marcellus Shale from January through
November, 2011); R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., NEWARK EAST (BARNETT SHALE) DRILLING
PERMITS ISSUED (1993–2010), http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/drillingpermitsissued.pdf
(last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (showing 4145 permits issued during the peak Barnett drilling year of
2008); cf. Kulander, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that about 35,000 wells are fractured annually).
Not all of these 35,000 wells, of course, are newly-drilled wells.
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As fracturing has allowed more wells in new formations to be
drilled, the sheer increase in well numbers has led to a range of
environmental effects that can begin long before the actual fracturing
occurs. As with any type of oil or gas well, a developer must construct
20
21
a well pad and a road to the pad, drill the well, store drilling wastes
22
at the surface in a pit or tank, and then dispose of these wastes.
Water for drilling must be withdrawn from surface or underground
sources, or, if not withdrawn on site, piped or trucked in and then
23
temporarily stored. As described in more detail in part I, drilling
fluids and muds may spill on the surface of well pads, produced water
may spill during transfer or leak from a surface pit, and oil from
24
drilling equipment may leak onto well pads. Improperly cased wells
may also leak methane at the drilling stage, causing methane to
25
migrate into soil and water sources.
Fracturing expands these familiar risks by enabling more
development and adds new ones unique to fracturing-related
activities. The horizontal drilling that often precedes fracturing can
concentrate certain environmental effects like air pollution, but can
also have positive impacts including less surface disturbance, reduced
26
erosion, and avoidance of sensitive habitats. Before fracturing

20. AM. PETROLEUM INST., FREEING UP ENERGY: HYDRAULIC FRACTURING:
UNLOCKING AMERICA’S NATURAL GAS RESOURCES 6 (2010), http://www.api.org/policy/
exploration/hydraulicfracturing/upload/HYDRAULIC_FRACTURING_PRIMER.pdf
(describing the “land disturbance” necessary to develop a shale gas well); N.Y. DEP’T OF
ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-135 (describing access road and well pad
construction).
21. AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 20, at 6 (describing the “four or five weeks of rig
work” that precede well fracturing).
22. JOSEPH DANCY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L. FOUND., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY II, CHAPTER 5: SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF COMMONLY ENCOUNTERED OIL FIELD WASTES at
*1, *3 (1994), available at Westlaw 35A RMMLF-INST 5 (1994).
23. Cf. N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at ES-9 (“Water for
hydraulic fracturing may be obtained by withdrawing it from surface water bodies away from
the well site or through new or existing water-supply wells drilled into aquifers.”).
24. Hannah Wiseman, State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations (Univ. of
Texas Energy Inst., Draft White Paper, Jan. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992064.
25. See, e.g., EAST RES., INC., DELCIOTTO NO. 2, SUBSURFACE NATURAL GAS RELEASE
REPORT ROARING BRANCH, MCNETT TOWNSHIP, LYCOMING COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 10–11
(Sept. 18, 2009) (contained in October 7, 2011, response to Right-to-Know request 4400-11-170)
(describing gas in soil, natural springs, and wells, some of which was naturally occurring and
some of which likely leaked from an improperly-cased well) (on file with DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F.).
26. I am grateful to Professor Bruce Kramer for his description of the positive and
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27

begins, fracturing chemicals must be transported to well sites; these
28
29
fluids can spill from trucks during transport or transfer. Operators
must withdraw significantly more water for slickwater fracturing than
for conventional natural gas drilling or other fracturing techniques,
requiring approximately one to seven million gallons for each
30
31
fracturing treatment. Expanded water use can affect water quality
32
and reduce stream flow, thereby negatively impacting stream biota
33
and reducing long-term supply. Hoses moved from one water
withdrawal site to another can introduce disease spores and invasive
34
species to surface waters. Shipment of both water and chemicals to

negative effects of horizontal drilling in his comments on my Energy Institute paper, supra note
24. See also NAT’L PARK SERV., POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL GAS
RESOURCES
IN
THE
MARCELLUS
SHALE
8
(2008),
available
at
http://www.eesi.psu.edu/news_events/EarthTalks/2009Spring/materials2009spr/NatParkServiceGRD-M-Shale_12-11-2008_view.pdf (noting that horizontal drilling “could result in fewer
impacts than conventional vertical wells due to greater flexibility in well location”); U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF ADVANCED OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY 34 (1999) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL
BENEFITS], available at http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/environ_benefits/
env_benefits.pdf (describing the benefits of horizontal drilling, including producing more
resources with fewer wells).
27. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 26, at 9 (estimating that transport of “completion fluids
and materials” requires somewhere between 100 and 1000 truck trips to a well site).
28. See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 6-315 (“Transportation of
any hazardous materials always carries some risks from spills or accidents. Hazardous materials
are moved daily across the state without incident, but the additional transport resulting from
horizontal drilling poses an additional risk, which could be an adverse impact if spills occur.”).
29. Id. at 5-81 (describing chemical transfer from trucks).
30. See supra note 6.
31. Much of the use is consumptive in that it fails to return the used water to the local
basin. See SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N, ACCOMMODATING A NEW STRAW IN THE
WATER: EXTRACTING NATURAL GAS FROM THE MARCELLUS SHALE IN THE SUSQUEHANNA
RIVER BASIN, at 1 n.2 (2009) (citing 18 CFR § 806.3 (2009)), available at
http://www.srbc.net/programs/docs/Marcellus%20Legal%20Overview%20Paper%20%28Beaud
uy%29.pdf.PDF.
32. N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 6-2 to -3.
33. Cf. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WATER USE, supra note 6 (“Increasing water use due to
growing population, drought, and Barnett Shale development has heightened concerns about
water availability in North-Central Texas.”). But see N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
supra note 6, at 6-4 (noting that “projected water withdrawals and consumptive use of water [for
high-volume hydraulic fracturing] are modest relative to overall water withdrawals in New
York”).
34. See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 6-4 (“Transporting water
from the water withdrawal location for use off-site . . . can transfer invasive species from one
water body to another via trucks, hoses, pipelines, and other equipment.”); COLO. OIL & GAS
CONSERVATION COMM’N, Rule 1204(a)(2), 2 C.C.R. 404-1 § 1204(a)(2) (2009) (“In designated
Cutthroat Trout habitat . . . operators shall disinfect water suction hoses and water
transportation tanks withdrawing from or discharging into surface waters . . . used previously in
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well sites expands truck trips to the site, causing damage to roads and
35
local traffic problems. Fracturing also increases the pressure on the
36
well, which increases the risks of casing failure. Finally, during and
after fracturing, chemicals can spill from tanks, and flowback water—
fluid that flows back up out of the well after fracturing—can be
37
mishandled.
States have taken a variety of approaches to address these
potential effects. Several states have begun updating their regulations,
for example, to require stronger casing, to prevent leakage of oil and
gas wastes from surface pits, and to prohibit the use of certain
38
chemicals in fracturing. Furthermore, states continue to apply new
and preexisting regulations by inspecting well sites, noting violations,
and, in some cases, by taking enforcement action, such as issuing
administrative orders, entering into consent orders, and imposing
39
penalties. This article addresses these latter inspection and
enforcement activities, exploring how state agencies have applied
regulations to oil and gas operators.
Part I briefly introduces state regulatory programs and provides
examples of the types of violations that states have noted at oil and
another river, lake, pond, or wetland” in order to control the introduction of disease spores.).
35. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 26, at 8–9; PENN STATE COLL. OF AGRIC. SCI.,
MARCELLUS SHALE: WHAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NEED TO KNOW 11 (2008),
available at http://downloads.cas.psu.edu/naturalgas/pdf/MarcellusShaleWhatLocalGovernment
Officialsneedtoknow.pdf.
36. Cf. N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 6-55 (“During hydraulic
fracturing operations, the pressure in the well is greater than the pressure in the
formation . . . .”).
37. Although this article focuses on the potentially negative environmental effects of
fracturing and states’ application of regulations to activities that can cause these effects, it is
important to note several positive environmental developments in addition to the benefits of
drilling multiple wells on a pad. For a summary of these benefits, see U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS, supra note 26.
38. See, e.g., N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.10 (2008) (requiring lined pits and, in some
situations, steel tanks for storing oil and gas wastes).
39. The enforcement scheme for state environmental or oil and gas laws is complex and
varies substantially. States often divide enforcement activity into two broad categories of
“formal” and “informal” enforcement. See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., ENFORCEMENT
MANUAL
12
(Revised
Dec.
2004),
available
at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/
legal/Enforcement/chapters/chapter2.pdf; Oil and Gas Regulatory Enforcement, OHIO DIV. OF
OIL
AND
GAS
RES.
MGMT.,
http://www.ohiodnr.com/mineral/enforcement/tabid/
17872/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2012). For examples of the variety of the types of
enforcement actions taken, see General Users Guide to the COGCC Hearing Process, COLO.
OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, available at http://cogcc.state.co.us/Hearings/
HearingGuide.htm; MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDINGS FACT SHEET, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/ogscompliance-factsheet_262981_7.pdf.
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gas sites since shale or tight sands development became more
common. Part II describes the types of enforcement actions that
40
states have taken in response to these violations. It is important to
note that the violations and enforcement actions explored here are
not comprehensive because full data sets from each state were
unavailable at the time of publication. It is also important to
recognize that the violations and enforcement actions described are
associated with a variety of well types—Antrim Shale wells in
Michigan, for example, require substantially different fracturing and
41
drilling techniques than Barnett Shale wells in Texas. With these
caveats in mind, the data described paint a preliminary picture of
regulations beyond their text, showing that states’ notations of
violations of environmental and oil and gas laws and resulting
enforcement actions vary substantially.
I. STATE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY AT SHALE
GAS AND TIGHT SANDS WELL SITES
Due to several federal exemptions for oil and gas development
42
and fracturing, states bear the primary responsibility for regulating
shale gas development. State regulation has garnered enhanced
attention as drilling and fracturing have boomed, inspiring both praise
and critique. Some commentators have focused on the exemptions
from federal regulation that oil and gas operators enjoy and have
argued that applicable federal regulation is inadequate to protect
43
Others have proposed that
health and the environment.

40. The violations described in Part I include all instances where inspectors noted a
violation or issued a notice of violation.
41. See generally HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS, AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE,
UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES 2–5 (2008), available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/
solutions/contents/Shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf (describing different shales (not including
the Antrim) and how development practices in the shales differ; introducing the Antrim Shale).
42. For discussion of federal regulation and exemptions, see James R. Cox, Revisiting
RCRA’s Oilfield Waste Exemption as to Certain Hazardous Oilfield Exploration and Production
Wastes, 14 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2003). See also Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation, supra note 3,
at 242–47 (describing the exemption of fracturing (with the exception of fracturing with diesel
fuel) from the definition of “underground injection” under the Safe Drinking Water Act, and
the more general exemption of oil and gas exploration and production (or “E&P”) wastes from
the hazardous waste portion of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); id. at 242
(explaining that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
does not apply to spills of petroleum and gas); Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and
Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV. (SIDEBAR) 1, 5–6 (2011)
(explaining that the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act does not require
reporting of annual releases of toxic substances from oil and gas sites).
43. See, e.g., Mark A. Latham, The BP Deepwater Horizon: A Cautionary Tale for CCS,
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municipalities, although limited in some cases by state preemption,
44
must improve oversight of drilling and fracturing. With all the
attention paid to regulatory content, however, it is easy to forget that,
as thousands of new gas wells are developed each year, state agencies
are on the ground, shaping the contours of these new and existing
regulations through their application. To understand how existing
regulations operate—and how proposed regulations might play out—
it is necessary to develop a better understanding of the
implementation of regulations by states. Regulations that appear
strong as written may have little effect as enforced while seemingly
inconsequential regulations may meaningfully influence development
if broadly interpreted and frequently enforced by states. This part
provides a glimpse into regulations of well development and
fracturing, as applied by state agencies, first by introducing state
regulatory programs and then by describing the types of violations
noted at shale gas and tight sands sites over the last decade.
A. State Regulation of Shale Gas and Tight Sands Development
In most states, one agency—either an oil or gas or environmental
agency—has primary authority over oil and gas development. Many
state oil and gas commissions, which originally held this authority,
had mandates to preserve these resources and protect the rights of
45
neighboring owners, whose resources could be drained. In addition
to this core conservation mandate, limited regulation for basic safety

Hydrofracking, Geoengineering and Other Emerging Technologies with Environmental and
Human Health Risks, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 58–59 (2011) (criticizing the
Safe Drinking Water Act exemption, concluding that “the current federal regulatory approach
is insufficient to protect human health and the environment from the risks associated with
hydraulic fracturing,” and observing that the government has taken an “after-the-fact,
piecemeal approach to regulation” that has “turned the precautionary principle on its head”);
Elizabeth Burleson, Cooperative Federalism and Hydraulic Fracturing: A Human Right to a
Clean Environment, _ CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y _ (forthcoming 2013), draft available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2007234
(noting
that
“[r]egulatory
coordination is lacking with regard to unconventional natural gas extraction and its
health/environmental impacts”). But see Kevin J. Garber et al., Water Sourcing and Wastewater
Disposal: Two of the Least Worrisome Aspects of Marcellus Shale Development in Pennsylvania,
13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 169, 172 (2011) (expressing some optimism about updated EPA and state
regulations for wastewater management, the development of industry best practices, and other
responses to risks).
44. See generally John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son Returns: Oil and Gas Drillers Return to
Pennsylvania with a Vengeance: Are Municipalities Prepared?, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (2011).
45. See GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 14 (“Throughout the period
1946 to 1960, most oil and gas producing states established a regulatory agency to
enforce oil and gas conservation practices.”).
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46

also emerged; states required the plugging of wells, for example, and
promulgated basic well construction requirements to protect
47
groundwater. As environmental concerns expanded, so too did the
responsibility of state agencies to respond to the environmental
effects of oil and gas development.
Today, the state agency with primary authority over oil and gas
development regulates issues such as the casing of wells to prevent
groundwater contamination, the construction and maintenance of
surface pits in which oil and gas waste is stored, and the disposal of oil
48
and gas waste. Frequently, a second agency has limited jurisdiction
over certain issues, such as air quality or the accumulation of low
levels of radiation on oil and gas equipment that results from drilling
49
and its associated wastes.
The capacity of these agencies to execute the regulations
assigned to them varies widely. Based on a survey of a limited
number of state agencies, the total number of field inspectors
employed in 2011 ranged from approximately four in Maryland to
50
twenty-eight in Ohio and eighty-four in Pennsylvania. Texas, a

46. An operator plugs a well by pumping cement down it. If done properly, this seals the
well, preventing water and other substances from leaking into it and gas or oil from leaking out.
R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WELL PLUGGING PRIMER 6–7 (2008), available at
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/forms/publications/plugprimer1.pdf.
47. GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 13.
48. Id. at 15 (noting that “[m]any states formed separate departments to administer overall
environmental regulations because of the programmatic shift in emphasis toward protection of
water and land resources” in oil and gas drilling).
49. In Texas, for example, the Railroad Commission has the bulk of regulatory authority
over oil and gas wells, but the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)
administers air quality regulations at well sites. See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., BARNETT SHALE
INFORMATION, http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/index.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2012)
(explaining that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over “roads, traffic, noise, odors,
leases, pipeline easements, or royalty payments” and that local governments and other state
agencies control roads and traffic issues, while the TCEQ addresses “odors and air
contaminants”). See also Hannah Wiseman & Francis Gradijan, Regulation of Shale Gas
Development, at 114–15 (Univ. of Texas Energy Inst., Draft White Paper, Oct. 2011), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953547 (describing how several different
agencies often have responsibility for various forms of naturally occurring radioactive materials
from oil and gas development). Naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) can
accumulate at oil and gas sites (and equipment that handles these materials can pick up low
levels of radioactivity) because portions of the drilled formation, which are naturally
radioactive, can be deposited “on well casing and in downhole equipment.” The Need and
Desirability to Issue an Order Establishing Particular Requirements for Plugging of Wells
Where Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) May be Present, MICH. DEP’T
NATURAL RES. ORDER NOS. 3-6-92 & (M) 1-6-92, at 1 (1992), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/ogs-oilandgas-sow-3-6-92_261340_7.pdf.
50. Wiseman, State Enforcement, supra note 24, at 13–14.
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historically active oil and gas state, employed 125 inspectors in 2008 at
its Railroad Commission—the agency with primary regulatory
51
authority over oil and gas sites in the state. The number of staff
employed is largely influenced by the number of wells: Maryland,
52
with no hydraulically fractured shale wells to date, would reasonably
expect fewer incidents than would the Texas Railroad Commission
and would therefore hire fewer staff. Inspection and enforcement
capacity is also affected by state budgets, agency priorities, and
political directives from governors and legislatures. In Pennsylvania,
for example, the Department of Environmental Protection—the
agency tasked with enforcing most state regulations of oil and gas
wells—increased the fees attached to the permit that each operator
must obtain before drilling a well and used the money to hire more
53
staff. The permit fee rose from $100 to an average of approximately
54
$2850, and the total staff increased from 90 to 202, with 84 of these
55
staff members devoted to field inspections. The Texas Railroad
Commission, in contrast, has had to oversee expanding development
56
with decreasing levels of funding and staffing.
B. Preliminary Data on Violations
Some state agencies tasked with executing environmental
regulations—often in addition to ensuring oil and gas conservation
and protecting mineral rights—have been overwhelmed by the pace
57
and volume of new well development. In Texas, in 2010 alone, 2157
58
drilling permits were issued for the shale, and between 2010 and
2011, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, which is
primarily responsible for air quality issues at well sites, received
approximately 535 complaints associated with Barnett Shale
51. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT 97 (2009), available at
http://www.sunset.state.tx.us/82ndreports/rct/ser.pdf.
52. Telephone interview by Matthew Pena with Wes McBride, Engineer, Md. Dep’t of the
Env’t, Mining Program (July 15, 2011).
53. MARCELLUS SHALE ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 17, at 65.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 66.
56. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 51, at 14.
57. See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Protecting Oil from Water – The History of State Regulation,
GREENWIRE, Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/12/14/1 (quoting
Randy Huffman, Secretary, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, “Quite
frankly, our regulatory structure is not prepared to deal with it. . . . All of a sudden we have,
basically, a brand new industry that shows up on the scene. We see a lot of things, that quite
frankly, the state was not prepared for.”).
58. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., DRILLING PERMITS ISSUED, supra note 19.
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59

development. In Pennsylvania, the number of wells drilled in the
60
61
Marcellus Shale skyrocketed from 195 in 2008 to 1751 in 2011.
The increased number of new wells comes, in some cases, with a
correspondingly high number of violations and enforcement actions,
although this varies considerably among states. In Pennsylvania in
2011, for example, the Department of Environmental Protection
conducted 10,307 site inspections of Marcellus Shale wells, noted
violations at 6.3% of inspected sites for a total of 1189 violations, and
62
took 213 enforcement actions. The Texas Railroad Commission
conducted 120,866 site inspections of all oil and gas sites in the state
63
(not just Barnett Shale sites ), noted environmental violations at
18.5% of these sites, and referred 535 violations for enforcement
64
action. Total enforcement actions at fractured well sites in Texas in
2010, the latest year for which a full data set was available, were
65
comparatively small, at only five. A number of factors could
59. Wiseman, State Enforcement, supra note 24, at 25.
60. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 2008 WELLS DRILLED, http://www.dep.state.pa.us/
dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/BOGM%20Website%20Pictures/2008/2008%20Wells%20Drilled.jp
g (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
61. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., WELLS DRILLED, supra note 19.
62. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS MANAGEMENT COMPLIANCE
REPORT (Query Range: 01/01/2011 to 12/31/2011) [hereinafter PA. 2011 VIOLATIONS AND
ENFORCEMENTS] (downloaded Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.depreportingservices.state.pa.us/
ReportServer/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?/Oil_Gas/OG_Compliance (spreadsheet on file with
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.). For the purposes of this article, “enforcement” refers to any
formal agency response to a notation that a violation occurred; enforcements identified for this
article included administrative orders, agreed orders, agency issuance of penalties, and agency
directives for remedial action at well sites. A violation, in turn, is defined as any instance in
which a document noted a violation, issued a notice of violation, or identified the statute or
regulation violated at a well site. This line is, by necessity, blurry. Often, a state might consider a
notice of violation to be an informal enforcement action (not just a violation), as this notice
often would be followed either by the violator’s voluntary correction of the violation or an
administrative order. See supra note 39.
63. The Texas dataset described herein includes, presumably, a number of wells that were
never hydraulically fractured because it includes all wells in the state, including conventional
wells outside of the Barnett Shale.
64. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 51, at 90–91.
65. See Hannah Wiseman, TEXAS VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS (2011), at PERMIT
NOS. 31137, 0658516, 0552969, 0672613, 0683121 [hereinafter TEX. VIOLATIONS AND
ENFORCEMENTS] (spreadsheet compiling violation and enforcement data provided by the Texas
Railroad Commission in response to author’s query) (spreadsheet on file with DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F., original data on file with author). Raw data inputted into the spreadsheet are from
hard copy enforcement files provided to the author by Leslie Savage, Chief Geologist, Oil and
Gas Division, Railroad Comm’n of Tex. Additionally, an enforcement case for Permit no.
0682577 began in 2010 but was reassigned and completed in 2011. Enforcement was so low in
part because the Commission “underwent a hiring freeze beginning in 2009 and lost personnel.”
E-mail from Leslie Savage, Chief Geologist, Oil and Gas Division, Railroad Comm’n of Tex., to
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contribute to discrepancies in the percentage of violations that lead to
enforcement, including, for example, whether site visits are conducted
routinely or primarily in response to complaints; whether advance
warning of inspections is provided; whether agencies face different
political motivations for identifying violations and taking
enforcement action; whether agencies have adequate staff to take
66
enforcement action when violations are identified; and whether
industry best practices tend to vary between regions.
This section further examines the types of violations and
enforcements that arose from inspections in several states with recent
shale gas and tight sands development. To gather data on violations
and resulting enforcement actions at shale gas wells, agency staff in
approximately fifteen states were asked to provide data on all
complaints, violations, and enforcements at fractured wells between
approximately 2008 and 2011 or earlier if fracturing had been
common for a longer time period. Some states provided no
information, while others provided a wealth of data. Some of these
data were not comprehensive, and some included a limited number of
unfractured wells. Data from Michigan, for example, included all
Antrim Shale wells; this article assumes that all of these wells were
fractured. This information, though incomplete, still yields several
interesting results.
In the four states for which violation and enforcement data were
evaluated, the most common violations of state environmental laws at
shale gas and tight sands sites involved failures to obtain permits or
submit reports, failures to mow weeds around wellheads or post
proper signs, improper construction or maintenance of surface pits,
and surface spills of various drilling materials. These results are
summarized in Table 1.

author, Feb. 27, 2012 (noting that “[u]nless a violation is egregious or an immediate threat, the
RRC may allow the operator 15–30 days to correct the violation before pursuing other
mechanisms, including seals and severances, legal enforcement, etc.”) (on file with DUKE
ENVTL. L & POL’Y F.).
66. See, e.g., E-mail from Leslie Savage, supra note 65 (in response to a question about
why enforcement actions at hydraulically fractured well sites dropped from 2008 through 2009
to 2011, explaining that “Legal Enforcement was down two attorneys” and that the Commission
faced other staffing challenges).
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Table 1. Most Common Violations at Shale Gas and Tight Sands Sites
by Percent of Total Violations
67

68

69

70

Louisiana
2009–2011

Michigan
1999–2011

New Mexico
2000–2011

Texas
2008–2011

Permitting &
reporting

9.5%

0%

7.8%

32.3%

Pit construction
& maintenance

33.2

0.2

1.3

4.8

Signs & labeling

23.7

32.5

18.2

1.6

Site maintenance

0.9

22.4

0

0

Surface spill:
produced water

0.5

0.2

33.8

0

Surface spill: nonproduced water
or unidentified
substance

3.3

24.5

5.2

0

As Table 1 shows, violations of sign and labeling requirements
were the most common shared violations among the states analyzed.
These violations included failures to post an identification sign with

67. Hannah Wiseman & Molly Wurzer, LOUISIANA VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS
(2011) [hereinafter LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS] (spreadsheet compiling violation
and enforcement data provided by the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources in response
to research assistant query) (spreadsheet on file with DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F., original data
on file with author). Raw data from online database collected by Molly Wurzer. Louisiana
maintains databases of compliance order initiations and compliance order paperwork; the latter
is not uploaded until after a compliance order is resolved. Information on suspended
compliance reports was not available.
68. Hannah Wiseman & Jeremy Schepers, MICHIGAN, NEW MEXICO, AND WYOMING
VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS (2011) [hereinafter MICH., N.M. & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND
ENFORCEMENTS] (spreadsheet compiling violation and enforcement data provided by the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and New Mexico Energy, Minerals, and
Natural Resources Department in response to research assistant query) (spreadsheet on file
with DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F., original data on file with author). Raw data inputted into the
spreadsheet are from files provided by state agencies, including agreed orders, notices of
inspection, and field activity reports, and searches of state agency online databases, including
New Mexico’s spill database available at https://wwwapps.emnrd.state.nm.us/ocd/
ocdpermitting//Data/Incidents/Spills.aspx.
69. Id.
70. TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65.
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71

the well number or signs warning of poison gas, improperly located
72
73
signs, and a lack of visible well identification signs, among others.
Permitting and reporting violations, which dominated the Texas
74
Railroad Commission’s violations, appeared to involve failures to
75
obtain a permit before drilling or fracturing a well, and failures to
76
obtain approval of surface casing programs before drilling. Another
common procedural violation in Texas involved operators’ failures to
submit completion reports—which provide data about how the well
was drilled and fractured and the formations encountered during the
77
process—within ninety days of completing a well.
The site maintenance issues in Michigan nearly all involved
“vegetation growing near the wellhead” that needed to be removed,
weeds around wellheads, and seventy-five foot areas around
wellheads that were not cleared. Michigan inspectors also
occasionally noted “unused machinery” on well sites that required
78
removal.
Violations with potentially substantial environmental effects
included pit construction and maintenance problems. In New Mexico,
for example, an inspection revealed an unpermitted pit containing
79
waste that was over the pit liner, resulting in a $5000 fine. Allowing
contents in a pit to sit above the liner level can cause pit contents to
80
seep into the soil or water around the pit. In Louisiana, a pit

71. MICH., N.M. & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68.
72. See, e.g., LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 237610
(noting incorrectly placed “[w]ell sign on rear entrance to well”).
73. See, e.g., MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68
(listing 73 violations for “no visible well identification signs”).
74. Texas violation data do not provide field inspector notes but rather list the
regulation(s) violated.
75. TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65, at PERMIT NOS. 0637567,
232848, 233600, DOCKET NOS. 09-0259689, 09-0259690 (noting that a permit was issued after the
operator paid a $14,500 penalty, and noting a violation of 16 Tex. Admin. Code 3.5C).
76. Id. at PERMIT NOS. 226145, 226156, 0626246; DOCKET NO. 09-0251997 (noting
violations of 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.5C, 3.13(b)(2)(A)(I)).
77. TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65.
78. MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, PERMIT NO.
46116.
79. Id. at PERMIT NO. 30-045-32300.
80. For all well sites (including those at which fracturing may not have occurred), New
Mexico maintains a list describing “cases where pit substances contaminated New Mexico’s
groundwater,” which in 2008 contained more than 200 active cases of groundwater
contamination. See N.M. ENERGY, MINERALS & NATURAL RES. DEP’T, OIL CONSERVATION
DIV., CASES WHERE PIT SUBSTANCES CONTAMINATED NEW MEXICO’S GROUNDWATER,
DATA (as of Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/ocd/documents/
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81

containing drilling wastes similarly lacked adequate freeboard—
space in the pit above the waste to prevent overflow—and staff noted
“excessive accumulation of produced water, waste oil, and trash in
82
[the] reserve pit.” In other cases in Louisiana, oil tank seal valves
83
were “not equipped with the proper locking and sealing devices,”
and various levels of pollutants like selenium or arsenic in reserve pits
84
exceeded regulatory levels when the pits were tested at closure.
Of perhaps more concern than leaking pits are the high
percentage of violations in several states associated with surface
85
spills. The spills arose from a number of incidents, including
86
87
malfunctioning and frozen tanks in New Mexico that released
produced water, and an overflowing tank that spilled 142 barrels of
88
produced water, only 70 of which were recovered. In Louisiana, an
operator used tanks intended for fracturing substances to store
produced water; a “gauging error” caused an overflow, and the
89
produced water migrated into a “ditch and swampy area.” Incidents
in Pennsylvania, although not yet comprehensively analyzed to
indicate the most common types of violation, also involved a number
of spills, including discharges of ethylene glycol to a well pad and

GWImpactPublicRecordsSixColumns20081119.pdf.
81. The violation referred to a reserve pit, and reserve pits typically contain drilling
wastes. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8 (2011) (defining a reserve pit as a “[p]it used in
conjunction with drilling rig for collecting spent drilling fluids; cuttings, sands, and silts; and
wash water used for cleaning drill pipe and other equipment at the well site”).
82. LA.VIOLATIONS AND Enforcements, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 239783.
83. Id. at PERMIT NO. 240741.
84. Id. at PERMIT NOS. 240662, 238448, 238637, 239603 (indicating violations of 43:XIX
LA. ADMIN. CODE § 313).
85. Indeed, the percentage of spill violations in Texas may be underreported, as some
violations of 16 Texas Administrative Code § 3.8d, involving improper storage or disposal of oil
and gas wastes, may represent spills. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d) (providing accepted
and prohibited types of pits and disposal methods); TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS,
supra note 65 (describing Texas Railroad Commission violations, which described § 3.8(d)
violations without explaining the specific activity that caused the violations).
86. MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at PERMIT
NO. 30-045-33599, INCIDENT NO. nRMD0931632498; PERMIT NO. 30-039-30192, INCIDENT NO.,
nBP0804351507.
87. Id. at PERMIT NOS. 30-039-26070, INCIDENT NO. nDGF0503437776; 30-039-25478,
INCIDENT NO. nBP0918932635.
88. Id. at PERMIT NO. 30-039-25947, INCIDENT NO. nDGF0100955815.
89. LA.VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 238585.
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91

flowback to a drainage ditch, small drilling-fluid spills, and a
92
fifteen-gallon spill of diesel to a well pad.
Taken together, these state violations raise several issues. Each
state tends to have a different category of most common violation,
suggesting a number of possible reasons for variance: the types of
operators drilling wells, assuming large operators with more
93
experience cause fewer violations; climate and other local factors,
assuming states with more precipitation may experience more pit
overflows; different agency focuses and capabilities; or a lack of
adequate testing or monitoring equipment to identify problems such
as soil and water contamination or air pollution. Notably, all of the
most common violations are readily identifiable via a quick survey of
the site. Although other incidents, such as groundwater
contamination and air quality impacts, may in fact occur less often,
these violations’ lower frequencies may also be a function of their
difficulty to detect. State agencies should consider the effectiveness of
their inspections at assessing the full range of effects, including those
that are not readily identifiable.
States should not expect that their overburdened agencies will
adequately monitor thousands of new well sites—and new
technologies—with existing staff. Agencies and legislatures alike must
consider creative solutions for raising funds, such as Pennsylvania’s
94
approach of increasing permit fees, to ensure that agencies have the
capacity to inspect in the first place. While this point is frequently
noted, it cannot be overemphasized.
Another source of variation among the states, discussed below,
involves the range of enforcement actions taken in response to these
violations, which has important implications for deterrence, agency
funding (in states agencies that are partially funded through fees and
penalties), and industry’s internalization of the environmental costs
created by drilling and fracturing.

90. PA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 62, at PERMIT NO. 035-21179.
91. Id. at PERMIT NO. 035-21229.
92. Id. at PERMIT NO. 035-21178.
93. This assumption may not always hold true. In Texas, for example, 16 of the 51
Railroad Commission violations noted between 2008 and 2011 for fractured wells involved XTO
Energy, an ExxonMobil subsidiary. See TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65;
XTO ENERGY, http://www.xtoenergy.com/en/home.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
94. See text accompanying supra notes 54–55.
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II. ENFORCEMENT
When states note a violation of a regulation, they do not always
95
follow up with enforcement, therein creating variations among states
that echo differences in violations noted. In 2011, for example,
Pennsylvania assessed more than 1000 violations in the Marcellus
96
Shale yet took only 213 enforcement actions. Of the violations
identified in New Mexico’s tight sands, a noncomprehensive set from
2000 through 2011, approximately 21% resulted in clear enforcement,
such as a penalty or compliance order, and about 17% resulted in less
formal enforcement—records for these latter violations indicated
97
only that compliance was “resolved.”
Several factors likely contribute to variations in enforcement
among states. First, states record violations and enforcements
98
differently. Pennsylvania maintains a relatively comprehensive list,
while records for Texas only include violations that led to
99
enforcement. Second, in some cases, operators quickly fix problems
100
noted by inspectors, thereby mooting any necessary enforcement,
unless states wish to issue a penalty to deter future violations. In
other cases, agencies do not have independent powers to issue
penalties and thus may engage only in limited enforcement, such as
101
entering into compliance orders. In New Mexico in 2009, for
example, the state supreme court interpreted New Mexico’s statutes
to prevent the Oil Conservation Commission from issuing its own
civil penalties for environmental violations; penalties had to be sought

95. For a comparison of violations, numbers of fines, total amounts fined, and other
enforcement data in twelve states, see Ground Rules: Managing America’s Oil & Gas Boom,
E&E NEWS, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/special_reports/ground_rules (last visited
Apr. 10, 2012). For the definition of enforcement followed in this article, see supra note 62.
96. PA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 62.
97. MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68.
98. See, e.g., PA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 62.
99. See TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65.
100. See. e.g., MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at
PERMIT NO. 30-045-29580, INCIDENT NO. nRMD1010239182 (noting that “gasket on compressor
released natural gas,” that a violation was noted, and that the problem was “immediately
corrected”); E-mail from Leslie Savage, supra note 65.
101. See, e.g., N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.5.10(E) (allowing the director of the Oil Conservation
Division to “enter into an agreed compliance order with an entity against whom compliance is
sought to resolve alleged violations of any provision of the Oil and Gas Act”). Marbob Energy
Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n, 206 P.3d 135, 137 (N.M. 2009), invalidated this
provision’s granting of penalty issuance authorities to the division but did not appear to remove
other enforcement authorities. See id. at 143 (only invalidating the portion of the code
“pertaining to the Commission’s and the Division’s authority to impose penalties”).

Spring 2012]

FRACTURING REGULATION APPLIED

379

102

through the attorney general. The Texas Railroad Commission, on
the other hand, may issue penalties and even take criminal action in
103
limited circumstances.
The most important factor leading to variations among
enforcements may be the type and degree of violation. A failure to
obtain a permit for a deep well that poses particular casing challenges,
for example, could be far more serious than a permitting omission for
another well. Similarly, spills of unknown contaminants may be toxic
or benign, with no indication in the violation data.
The range of enforcement actions taken by states in response to
violations is summarized in Table 2, with the highest penalty for each
state in each category shown, where available.
Table 2. Enforcement Actions: Examples of Violations and Penalties

Permitting
& reporting

Louisiana

Michigan

New Mexico

Texas

Failure to obtain
work permit before completing
well, file completion report,
etc.

Violations noted

Failure to obtain
permit to produce and
transport gas

Failure to obtain
permit before
drilling well

No known enforcement from
data provided

Agreed order,
105

Agreed order,
$23,500

$14,500

Water above
liner in pit

Apparent failure
to properly dewater, backfill
reserve pit

Agreed order,
$1000
Pit construction &
maintenance

104

High levels of
arsenic, selenium, etc. at
reserve pit closure
Admin. order to
take appropriate
remedial action

Violations noted
No known enforcement from
data provided

Agreed order,
$5000

107

Agreed order,
$1000

108

106

102. Marbob, 206 P.3d at 137 (invalidating Section 19.15.5.10(B)(2) of the New Mexico
Administrative Code, which attempted to give the Commission the independent authority to
issue civil penalties).
103. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 51, at 90.
104. LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 240195.
105. TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65, at PERMIT NOS. 0637567,
232848, 233600, DOCKET NOS. 09-0259689, 09-0259690.
106. LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NOS. 240662, 238448.
107. MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at PERMIT
NO. 30-045-32300.
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Louisiana

Michigan

New Mexico

Texas

Improper I.D. of
well site and
tank battery

Violations noted

Failure to display well sign

No violations
identified

Admin. order to
post correct
sign
Site maintenance
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No known enforcement from
data provided

Agreed order,
$1000

110

109

No violations
identified

Violations noted

No violations
identified

No violations
identified

Spills of 15, 30,
60 barrels

No violations
identified

No known enforcement from
data provided
Surface spill:
produced
water

Salt water load
line from production facility
left open

Violations noted
No known enforcement from
data provided.

Admin. order to
report clean-up
methods
Surface spill:
unidentified
substance

e.g. notices of
violation

112

111

No violations
identified

Violations noted
No known enforcement from
data provided.

Improper disposal violation
that required
spill clean-up

Small leak of
unidentified
substance
e.g. phone call

113

Agreed order,
remediation and
$15,000

114

As Table 2 illustrates, given the broad categories in the data
provided by state agencies, the variability of violations within each
category is significant. Yet both the violation and enforcement data
can only tell us so much. More and better data are needed to fully
assess the range of actions that states are taking to control and
108. TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65, at PERMIT NO. 0612459,
DOCKET 09-0254013.
109. LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 239513.
110. MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at PERMIT
NO. 30-031-21067.
111. LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 23983.
112. MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at PERMIT
NO. 30-039-26101, VIOLATION NO. DGF0406442833; PERMIT NO. 30-045-30351, VIOLATION NO.
DGF0327357057; PERMIT NO. 30-045-31000, VIOLATION NO. DGF0327357057.
113. Id. at PERMIT NO. 30-045-30929, VIOLATION NO. RMD0918334882.
114. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., DOCKET NO. 09-0256803 (June 2008), available at
http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/pubomarchive$omarchive.queryview?P_OM_ID=106201&Z_C
HK=29227.
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mitigate the effects of shale gas and tight sands development. As the
Texas Railroad Commission notes, “[t]he [Railroad Commission] has
a vast store of information that is useful to industry and to the public.
Unfortunately most of this information is in paper or microfilm
115
records that must be copied or viewed in person.” Similarly, the
Arkansas Public Policy Panel, in a report that summarizes more than
500 violations at Arkansas Fayetteville Shale wells between 2006 and
2011, argues that the Arkansas Department of Environmental
Quality should make information on enforcement and violations
“readily available to citizens” and should improve its
116
recordkeeping. It notes that many files, for example, do not contain
any information on staff follow-up after staff initially noted a
violation.
Indeed, expanded sources of data would benefit all involved.
They would allow state agencies to show the efforts that they are
taking to record and prevent environmental damage—as the
117
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection and New
118
already do on their
Mexico Oil Conservation Commission
websites—and it would allow the public to assess progress.
Additionally, industry would have a better idea of the types of
violations that tend to occur and how to avoid them. Publishing
enforcement data, in particular, could have a deterrent effect.
Unfortunately, the agencies that have the data are already
overwhelmed by the responsibilities of inspecting new wells, issuing
enforcements, and, in some cases, revising regulations. More funding
is necessary to support these substantive efforts as well as to improve
datasets.
Overall, although agencies’ enforcement and inspection
capacities vary, the violations discussed in part I.B., above, show that
states are, to different degrees, striving to apply the regulations for
which they are responsible and to take enforcement actions where
appropriate. The regulations that tend to dominate inspection,
violation, and enforcement records, however, suggest that some of the
115. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 51, at 14.
116. ARKANSAS PUB. POL’Y PANEL, VIOLATIONS OF WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FROM
GAS PRODUCTION IN ARKANSAS 8 (2011), available at http://arpanel.org/content/
Violations%20of%20Water%20Standards.pdf.
117. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., MARCELLUS SHALE: TOUGH REGULATIONS,
GREATER ENFORCEMENT (2011), available at http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/
Get/Document-84024/0130-FS-DEP4288.pdf.
118. See, e.g., N.M. ENERGY, MINERALS & NATURAL RES. DEP’T, supra note 80 (showing a
list of surface pits that have contributed to groundwater contamination in New Mexico).
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oil and gas regulations most commonly applied are not grounded in
119
environmental protection, and that states are not prioritizing certain
regulations in their inspection efforts. This is understandable in light
of agencies’ sometimes conflicting mandates to ensure oil and gas
conservation, protect various mineral rights, and protect the
environment. While these are all worthy goals, it is possible that the
focus on conservation and mineral rights protection sometimes
120
displaces efforts to ensure environmental protection. This may be
problematic as hydraulic fracturing allows for the development of
thousands of new wells around the country, thus substantially
expanding the risk of negative environmental impacts.
CONCLUSION
Hydraulic fracturing for natural gas and oil in shales has changed
the American energy landscape and has immensely expanded state
responsibilities for environmental protection. States have core
regulatory authority over drilling and fracturing operations, and as
the number of wells drilled has quickly risen, many agencies face
overwhelming responsibilities. Inspectors are traveling to well sites,
noting violations, and, in some cases, taking enforcement action.
119. Many of the violations noted, for example, are associated with failures to obtain a
permit prior to well development or the sale or transportation of gas and failures to post
adequate signs on sites. See, e.g., MICH., N.M., AND WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS,
supra note 68. Regulations that require permits and signage are central to environmental
protection because they put the agency on notice of the well and allow the agency to inspect the
well once it is constructed. See, e.g., R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., OIL & GAS FILING CHECKLIST
FROM PROSPECT TO PRODUCTION, http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/forms/forms/og/checklist.php (last
visited Mar. 23, 2012) (noting that operators must “[n]otify the District Office at least 8 hours
prior to running and cementing surface casing”). They are also, however, intended to notify the
agency of the existence of the well to allow it to carry out its other duties of ensuring oil and gas
conservation (by limiting the amount of oil or gas that may be produced from the well, for
example, and collecting production data) and protecting other mineral owners’ rights. See, e.g.,
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37(c) (requiring a plan to be filed with the Railroad Commission that
must show, among other things, “all adjoining surrounding properties and completed wells in
the same field and reservoir within the prescribed minimum between-well spacing distance of
the applicant’s well”).
120. Cf. Soraghan, Protecting Oil From Water, supra note 57 (noting that “many of those
agencies that were in charge of controlling production are now responsible for protecting people
and the environment from the industrial hazards of the industry” and quoting a West Virginia
administrator as stating that the agency tasked with regulating oil and gas wells has “not evolved
to a point of considering the total impact of all the activity that’s going on in a given area”);
Mike Soraghan, 40% of State Drilling Regulators Have Industry Ties, GREENWIRE, Dec. 19,
2011, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/12/19/1 (noting that “most of the state oil
and gas agencies are expected to both police and promote the industry” and that the oil and gas
regulatory system began with the “goal of controlling production and protecting oil from water
rather than protecting the environment”).
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Some states, like Pennsylvania, have issued substantial penalties yet
still experience a significant number of violations of state
environmental laws. Penalties may not be adequately deterring
sloppy drilling and fracturing activity, or the state may be unusually
active in noting violations that other states have missed. The types of
violations noted among states vary significantly, suggesting that some
are simply focusing on different problems, that different companies
cause different environmental harms, or that local conditions cause
these harms to vary. The presence of more surface water, for
example, will likely lead to more violations of state water quality
laws. Enforcements also fall along a continuum, from no action to
severe penalties, with variations again likely arising from a range of
121
factors—some due to legitimate differences, and others perhaps
arising from insufficient agency will or capacity to enforce.
Beyond the need for improved violation and enforcement data,
state legislatures should more carefully consider the roles of the
agencies tasked with the bulk of oil and gas monitoring and
enforcement. Oil and gas agencies often wear several hats, including
ensuring that oil and gas are not wasted when produced, that
neighboring owners are not unfairly drained, and, finally, that the
environment is protected. In some cases, states may need to consider
whether these tasks require excessive juggling on the part of agencies,
122
or even create conflicts. State agencies responsible for licensing new
wells that benefit from severance taxes, at least indirectly, and other
revenue from these wells also face competing incentives to encourage
123
production while ensuring environmental protection.
Some agencies may also be focusing on the wrong details, such as
violations that are easy to spot. Field inspectors may easily note a
missing sign at a site or an obvious spill at the surface, while other
potential effects are hidden and risk being overlooked. Ensuring
more thorough inspections, however, will require improved staff
training and testing equipment, which raises a final, important point.
Just as agencies may lack adequate resources and may be focusing on

121. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 39 (describing states’ enforcement policies and
actions taken prior to formal enforcement, such as notices of violation followed by voluntary
compliance).
122. See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Drilling Regulators Pull Double Duty as Industry Promoters,
GREENWIRE, Nov. 30, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/11/30/1.
123. Cf. Arkansas Oil & Gas Comm’n, Rule A-7, Ark. Admin. Code 178.00.1-A-7
(explaining that the Commission sets well categories, which another agency then uses to
determine severance tax rates).
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the wrong environmental problems, they may also lack the power to
adequately enforce violations of environmental laws. Legislatures
must revisit agency functions and ensure that they have the power to
assess penalties of a sufficiently high amount to ensure deterrence
and to make operators pay for the environmental externalities that
124
they produce. Pennsylvania offers some of the most aggressive
examples of forcing polluters to pay: In February 2011, for example, it
issued a total of $565,000 in civil penalties against one energy
company for wetlands encroachment, erosion and sedimentation
125
violations, and a well blowout during fracturing.
As the drilling and fracturing of wells rushes forward, states are
revising regulations, inspecting well sites, and translating violations
into enforcement. The data set, in the meantime, continues to grow,
providing more lessons about the types of effects caused by
fracturing, the best means of avoiding these effects, and the violations
that are being overlooked or are simply uncommon. These lessons
suggest that states face a daunting task: some violations appear to
have caused substantial environmental harm, yet well numbers are
rising quickly and state officials often may not have the resources, the
will, or the authority to keep up. This preliminary analysis of
regulations as they are applied by states is in anticipation of future,
more detailed work. Hopefully, data and improved analysis of
existing violations and enforcement matters will provide a more
thorough understanding of how to properly enforce regulations. This
understanding is vital; dusty text within codes tells only a partial
regulatory story.

124. The Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission, for example, has proposed that “[c]ivil
penalties for violations of the Oil and Gas Act should be increased from $25,000 to $50,000 and
the daily penalty should be increased from $1000/day to $2000/day.” MARCELLUS SHALE
ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 17, at 105. It also argues that the DEP should be able to assess
penalties itself. Id.
125. Press Release, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., DEP Fines Chesapeake Appalachia $565,000
for Multiple Violations (Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/
portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=19258&typeid=1; Mike Soraghan, Pa. Well
Blowout Tests Natural Gas Industry on Voluntary Fracking Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/04/04greenwire-pa-well-blowout-tests-natural-gasindustry-on-36297.html (describing Chesapeake’s April 2011 well blowout during fracturing).

